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2 March 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 623

AFRICA

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA ANALYZED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Dec 78-3 Jan 79 p 17

[Article by Camara Souleymane of Conakry (Guinea), in "Forum" column: "We Are Ripe for Democracy". Editorial disclaimer: "JEUNE AFRIQUE does not necessarily approve of what is published under this heading; it is the author's responsibility."]

[Text] Certain African leaders are veritable postcolonial potentates. They exercise over their people a power of divine right, right of life and death. Who would have believed it--free Africa worse than colonial Africa? A poll taken at the present time would painfully reveal a strong majority of the people who, rather than say yes, would abstain from responding.

Those absolute sovereigns parachuted into the highest office are for the most part but socially mixed-up people who find in the exercise of power an unexpected gift from the gods, the means of gratifying their ambition and unhealthy hatred. Power is their reason for living, their soul. In their concern for guarding it at any price--even at the risk of their lives--they are putting into practice a diabolic Machiavellianism in order to subjugate the people:

A totalitarian single party channels the people and supervises their acculturation by means of stuffing them ideologically.

Producing permanent tension creates a climate of general suspicion, by means of broadcasting games quoting unceasingly and without respite imaginary plots against the security of the state. A weighty argument for isolating the country from the outside world and making the government safe from foreign news organs.

In that atmosphere of psychologic tension a similarly repressive police force, alias a popular militia with almost unlimited power, is sowing terror and desolation everywhere.

As a cover, there is no end to the labels: revolutionary, anti-imperialism, anti-neocolonialism, anti--ism.

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Faced with this organized hell, which even colonialism would have disapproved of and which is condemned by the humanitarian organizations of the entire world, the highest authority of independent Africa, the OAU, pretends to see nothing, to hear nothing, out of divine respect for the sacrosanct rule that the internal affairs of a state must not be interfered with. This defeatist and dangerously abetting attitude is causing Africa to lose thousands of brains and millions of arms which it so badly needs to emerge from the abyss of misery that is called under-development.

And when the people, in a final awakening launched by the unshakable instinct to survive, organize, take to the underground, install guerrilla warfare in order to free themselves from this servitude--as shameful as it is cruel--its torturers scream at imperialism and neocolonialism and immediately appeal to foreign forces in order to maintain themselves in power.

The misfortune which is befalling our continent comes in large part from its own sons, afflicted with the virus of power without sharing, who are introducing "the wolf into the sheepfold". White wolf or red wolf, aggressive wolf or peacable wolf, it is all wolf, the plan being the same: to devour the lamb. Africa is suffering the tragedy of the lamb.

The OAU must be operational, if that is necessary in order to stop or strangle the adventurousness of certain leaders who are using their people as guinea pigs. Any acute internal problem of one African country concerns all Africans, the OAU first of all. The OAU must prevent the sacking of the continent by hordes of shameful legionnaires from Havana or Paris, from Moscow or Washington. But it is indispensable for rational development that the people, in its diversity of language and thought, must participate fully in working out and executing its programs. That can be accomplished only in a climate of true democracy.

The birds of ill omen and the fishermen in troubled waters who are hurling at us this bitter challenge--"Africa is not ripe for democracy"--are the very same ones who by feeding the fires of tension are taking advantage of the continent's being torn apart to build or consolidate their empire on the bones of their sons. Democracy is the prerogative of no people, of no continent. It is the categorical choice of responsible men responding to the criteria of leaders. Africa still possesses men of such courage, a number of whom have been sacrificed on the altar of intolerance and political hatred.

As if they were listening to us in this continent so torn apart and lusted after, two nations in love with freedom have just taken up the bitter challenge: Senegal and Upper Volta, two poor countries, Sahelian to boot, with everything against them, are laying the cornerstones of the continent's democratic edifice.

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FRANCE REPORTEDLY PLANNING MISSILE BASES IN ZAIRE, GABON

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Jan-4 Feb 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Fode Amadou: "French Missiles in Zaire?"]

[Text] Missile bases in Zaire and Gabon. This is the Giscard-Bongo-Mobutu trio's latest African initiative.

A consortium of French companies, backed by Paris, is actually on the verge of concluding with the Zairian authorities a contract for the installation of a missile test base. The specialists in charge of the technical portion of the project are recommending that it be located on the parallel that passes approximately through Matadi and Kananga, by way of Tschikapa, 5 degrees south of the equator, north of the Angolan border.

The groundwork for the project was laid in May 1977, shortly after the French government agreed to provide Zairian President Mobutu with logistic support to put down the first Shaba uprising. Mobutu, who was already congratulating himself that he "never has problems with the purchase of arms from France," could hardly avoid turning a favorable ear to this suggestion, which had the twofold merit of not only ensuring that his allies would bail him out of trouble at the least sign of it, but also of providing him with comforting revenues. But the negotiations "in the Zairian style"--that is, with gratuities, receptions, cars and residences being offered to the negotiators--bogged down, the more so as the government's instability following the Shaba occurrences and the worsening of the economic crisis made it necessary to consider a permanent regeneration of the local partners, hardly facilitating the work of the French negotiators. The matter was reopened by the second Shaba uprising and the intervention by the French paratroopers.

During his round of thanks, Mobutu heard it made unmistakably clear to him by French President Giscard d'Estaing that those projects which are part of the grand Giscardian design for Africa must be brought quickly to pass.

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For Giscard, it was not a matter of seeming to let Germany outdo him in the region with OTRAG [Orbital Transport and Rocket, Inc], which since the beginning of 1976 has been installing its launching pads on the shores of the Tanganyika.*

What is more, the president of OTRAG had intentions that could disturb public opinion when he said, "We are trying to do as little harm as possible to project 'Ariane.' But 'Ariane' is a little like 'Concorde.' And it is certain that, commercially, we will be hard to beat." But this warning was not intended for the French leaders. At most, its intent was to spread confusion.

Although French military and diplomatic circles were indeed concerned, at the time of the revelation by AFRIQUE-ASIE, that the OTRAG operation might in fact be, for the Federal Republic of Germany, nothing other than a means of circumventing the prohibition against its manufacturing any atomic weapons, there was, at the summit, neither surprise nor new discovery. That Helmut Schmidt had personally advised Giscard of the OTRAG operation can be deduced from the EVENING STANDARD announcement, some time after AFRIQUE-ASIE, that a West German company, "connected with the government," was installing a missile test base in Zaire, as a result of "a joint operation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany." And the British newspaper gave many details concerning the planned launching of missiles with nuclear nose cones.

And if Giscard agreed, it was for various reasons: France, who wanted to project a sound African image, found herself, on the one hand, the fervent supporter of the puppets of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], the FNLA [Angolan National Liberation Front], and the FLEC [Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave]--dedicated to the destabilization of Angola, a country which enjoys great prestige in African public opinion--and, on the other hand, a not inconsequential partner of South Africa, particularly as regards armament. It was not a bad idea, therefore, to let the spotlight shine on a neighbor who was in a fair way to becoming a dangerous African rival while remaining in the shadows.

From another viewpoint, the "Ariane" missile, constructed principally by Aerospatiale for the European Space Agency, and due to be launched from the Kourou base in French Guinea, would be needing a new infusion of funds for the next stage of the work in course, during which construction was to start on the first six flight models. By closing his eyes to the OTRAG project, Giscard saw a means of easing his way over this hurdle. Besides, in this way, he also obtained assurances that nothing would be undertaken against the "Ariane" project, a prestige prop necessary to the role the president of the French republic counted on playing in the European concert, which also would enable him to deny any potential accusation of Atlantic Pact partisanship.

*See AFRIQUE-ASIE Nos 141 of 8 August 1977; 145 of 3 October 1977; 146 of 17 October 1977; 157 of 29 March 1978.

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Last, and not to be cast aside, is the fact that the French chief of state thus saw to it, through the German chancellor, that there would be no European backwash if France herself installed missile launching bases in the countries she deemed especially favorable for them because of geographic and political situation, like Zaire and Gabon.

It is also without surprise that we learned recently, from generally well-informed sources, that it was not just for a Christmas Eve party that the French president, after his visit to Guinea, flew to Libreville. Bongo's country, which already shelters an air base on which several hundred French military personnel are permanently stationed and which is the hub of the French special services for West Africa, is to be the scene of construction of a missile launching base, to which, as a little Christmas present, the Gabonese chief of state gave his agreement to Giscard.

Shelving and Assassination

An obviously essential military intent: These countries close to the equator provide the best locations for the launching of missiles--it is to be noted that Kourou (French Guinea) is located at 5 degrees north of the equator, with Matadi-Kananga 5 degrees south of the equator, and that Gabon itself is right on the equator. The geographical situations of Gabon and Zaire, moreover, enable the surveillance within missile range of the entire African continent from north to south and from east to west. Also an economic intent: The southern zone being, as is well known, particularly rich in minerals of all kinds, France intends to exploit and protect it. And lastly, a political intent: France, desirous of proving to her African "friends" that she can come to their aid at their minimum call, will find it necessary to reinforce her military potential on the continent.

Alas! All these military-politico-economic subtleties of Giscard's immediate entourage and of Giscard himself, shrouded as they are in the most rigorous secrecy, are not immediately perceptible at all levels, and the various special services, poorly informed of all these aims, find themselves somewhat at a loss. Was this the reason for the shelving of the official who, in a fit of zeal, took it upon himself to charter a plane from Dar-es-Salaam to fly over the OTRAG firing range? Was this the reason behind the assassination, reported by the daily news bulletin EVENEMENTS ET PERSPECTIVES of 30 November, of one of the members of the bodyguard of the director of OTRAG-France, created in Paris in June?

Be that as it may, and even though an atmosphere of crisis prevails among these services, the negotiations between the French and the Zairians for the installation of the missile launching base are proceeding, and, at the highest political level, they were on the business agenda of Mobutu's visit to France.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH AFRICAN POLICY EXPLAINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 78 pp 59-60

[Editorial: "The Principles of France's African Policy"]

[Text] With a year barely ended during which Africa was the theatre of events which in some cases led France to intervene either by diplomacy or its armed forces, the principles and prospects of French policy vis-a-vis Africa were masterfully presented before the Overseas Academy of Sciences by one of the very high officials who take an active part not only in executing that policy but also in its formulation, Guy Georgy, director of African and Malagasy affairs at the Quai d'Orsay [Ministry of Foreign Affairs].

That policy, or certain of its manifestations, have at times been contested in France as well as abroad. It was thus an opportune time to recall the principles of that policy while resetting its evolution in their international environment.

Above and beyond the contingencies of history, France's doctrine with regard to Africa, as with regard moreover to all of what was then "the French empire," was marked by a remarkable continuity. Until the eve of World War II, France, unlike Great Britain, pursued a policy of assimilation that it deemed to be most suited to ensuring the advancement of the African.

In the years [immediately] after the war, the evolution of ideas, the action of political parties in France and of African nationalist movements, and the maturation of the colonizers, the colonized [peoples] and international opinion were all contributing factors in the orientation of French policy toward a formula of association that was to be translated in the Constitution of 1946 by the creation of the French Union. Ten years later, the Cadre-Law of June 1956 was to definitively abandon assimilation in favor of association. Internal autonomy was to be acknowledged by the Constitution

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of 1958 and followed rapidly by the independence of Madagascar and all the territories that had comprised French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa.

The mere fact that, in most of the French-speaking states that had become independent the former governor, having quite naturally become high commissioner and then president of the council of government, would present his credentials as ambassador to the new chief of state, illustrates the continuity of French policy and at the same time explains the maintenance of privileged links between France and numerous African states. It also explains France's desire to see the decolonization of the entire African continent completed. For its part, France recognized Djibouti's independence in July 1977. It wishes that the decolonization process in Rhodesia and Namibia will be concluded.

Having become independent, the new states found themselves faced with essentially two problems: that of their borders, arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers, and that of choosing a model for political and economic development.

Very quickly, in 1963, the principle of the inviolability of borders was proclaimed by the OAU Charter, and there was a gradual strengthening of the identity of each national group, the force of which was attested to at that very time by such conflicts as those of the Horn of Africa, so much so that Mr Georgy is led to believe that the 21st century will be the "century of nationalities" for Africa, just as the 19th century was that for Europe. Today there is not a single African state that is ready to give up a few square kilometers of its national territory, even if they were devoid of any vegetable, animal or mineral resources.

As for the models of development proposed by the Westerners, which actually come down to two, liberalism and authoritarianism, both have ended up disappointing Africa. Liberalism, if the African elites can appreciate its advantages, is ill-suited to the African structures and is too often perceived by the masses as a system whose complexity is inaccessible to them and one which in reality exclusively favors the rich and powerful.

Because "socialism" theoretically aims at an equitable distribution of wealth, it met with more familiar vibrations in the minds of the Africans, who are accustomed to community life within their families and villages. But the results of the economic management of the African states that had adopted socialism are far from [meeting] the hopes of their peoples.

Africa is thus seeking an original path more in conformity with its traditional values and less alienating for [the African] man than Western societies. Whatever qualifications may be given to that search (authenticity, negritude, African socialism), it reflects a tendency that cannot but assert itself.

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The strengthening of nationalisms and search for an original path of development are therefore fundamental factors that the French African policy must take into consideration. That policy is based on the maintenance of peace, respect for internal regimes, the maintenance of cooperation and the consolidation of all Africa.

First of all, peace. Without peace on the continent, Africa will not be able to take up the formidable challenge already facing it, that of feeding its population and ensuring its development. A report presented last September at Arusha during the FAO's tenth regional conference indicates a food shortage of about 20 percent by 1985 (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, No. 1718, 13 October 1978). Africa must therefore devote all its resources and energies to rectifying this situation rather than to the purchase of armaments.

The maintenance of peace in an Africa that has become a stake for the great powers implies the integrity of the borders set by the colonizers, as imperfect as they may be, respect for independence, and rejection of interference in internal affairs. Those are the principles affirmed by the UN and OAU and recognized by France. Their application sometimes poses thorny problems, as is shown by a number of inter-African conflicts (Western Sahara, Eritrea), but France resolutely condemns any external aggression against an African state. It feels that the solution to these conflicts must be sought by the Africans themselves within their own organizations, particularly the OAU, whose efforts France supports. If it has happened that France has intervened militarily in Shaba Province and Mauritania, for example, that involved shortlived operations, with only very small numbers of military, undertaken at the request of sovereign governments and aimed at enhancing the search for a peaceful solution.

In fact, France believes the African states have a right to security within their internationally recognized borders and to respect for their independence. Moreover, the latter is as seriously threatened by internal subversion as it is by frontal foreign attacks that generally evoke UN intervention and are condemned by international opinion. It is to strengthen the independence of friendly states, and only upon their request, that France maintains a few garrisons in Africa and makes assisting military personnel available to those states. Moreover, the number of such personnel is nowhere near the numbers of Cubans, Soviets and East Europeans in Africa (4,000 French gendarmes in Djibouti, and 1,600 French assisting military personnel for all Africa).

Along with the right to respect for independence is the right to respect for the regimes and institutions chosen by the African states themselves. France thus maintains ties of friendship and cooperation with states whose institutions are based on widely divergent political philosophies. France's reconciliation with Guinea is a recent example of that will of France to retain its old friendships and gain new ones. That is the rationale for the overture made by French diplomacy toward English- and Portuguese-speaking Africa and for the development of agreements for economic and technical cooperation with states which prior to the era of independence were relatively unacquainted with France and the French-speaking territories, but which today show themselves

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to be desirous of developing their relations with them and benefiting from French cooperation.

From the 1960s on, France has assigned from 4 to 5 billion francs to cooperation with Africa, which puts France in first place among the industrialized countries providing aid to the African continent. French aid, given to all countries desiring it, whatever their regimes may be like, is appreciated and increasingly being requested. It assumes more and more sophisticated forms in the area of training African cadres, as for example in teaching scientific disciplines, and is designed to obtain a multiplying effect in order to help in the mobilization of resources available from the other industrialized countries. France has set up new funds (African Solidarity Fund, an exceptional fund for the promotion of Africa) and, in recent years, has stepped up its efforts within multilateral bodies, in particular the European Development Fund, of which France provides 26 percent of the financing (i.e., as much as the Federal Republic of Germany, whose GNP is higher than that of France). Lastly, France is endeavoring, within the context of the North-South dialogue and all international negotiations, to obtain for Africa as for all the developing countries a guarantee of their resources, especially of their receipts for exports, and the stabilization of market prices for raw materials.

This policy of help for Africa is based on the conviction that it benefits not only Africa but France and Europe as well. Africa will become increasingly indispensable to Europe, which depends largely for its industrial activity on its imports of energy-producing products and raw materials. That is especially true of France, which depends on imports for 60 percent of its needs in this field. The other great continents or subcontinents endowed with raw materials are already reserving them for their own needs and are exporting only a very small portion of them (that is the case of the Soviet Union and the United States), or have opted for a policy of development that will lead them to use those materials domestically more and more (that is the case with Asia and Indonesia). Africa is therefore being called on to become more and more the privileged supplier of France and Europe. The mineral and other resources of the African continent are indeed enormous and are still relatively unexploited.

The reciprocal nature of the interests involved is certainly the best guarantee for Africa that French and European aid will be enduring.

It also represents for Africa a certainty that future relations with the former colonial powers and the outside world will be based increasingly on equality and that Africa will be treated as a respected partner. Moreover, the quality of the African leaders well-known to those who, like the director of African and Malagasy affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have had to conduct negotiations with them, suffices to give assurance that the young African states will be more and more able to discern where their own true interests lie and to elude the snares of "neocolonialism." It is also a promise of stability for the future.

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France for its part has opted for solidarity with Africa. French policy, refraining from any interference in the internal affairs of Africa and from any attempt at domination, gives particular attention to consolidating Africa's internal cohesion, of which it will have the greatest need in the coming years. In fact, between now and the end of the century, Africa will probably undergo a period even more difficult than that of decolonialization and the building of independence.

Africa will in fact have an increasing need for capital to continue with its own development. It is already heavily in debt (around \$100 billion). The former colonial powers now feel more or less free of their responsibilities toward Africa, and the other industrialized aid-giving countries are themselves going through the worldwide economic recession. The resources of the petroleum-producing countries have reached their limits fairly quickly. Lastly, the countries with capital may be tempted to seek investments with a higher return in countries that are more developed than Africa or on new markets opening to them, such as the Chinese market.

France and Europe must understand that their duty as well as their interest compel them to concentrate their aid and investment on the African continent. Africa for its part will have to give attention to finding the best ways to use those investments for its development, by defining priorities based solely on the consideration of the interest of its populations and by foregoing lavish expenditures and prestigious works.

At the same time that Africa will have to overcome its economic difficulties, it will be prey to the excesses of nationalism and the appetites of foreign powers who will seek to exert influence over it.

The wisdom and pragmatism of the Africans, peoples of peasants and shepherds, are bound to enable them to resist foreign seduction. If secular traditions of hospitality make it possible for all nations to penetrate an Africa that wants to be open to the outside world, recent history confirms on the other hand that if it is difficult to exert influence on Africa, it is even harder to maintain that influence.

The real danger for Africa lies rather in the temptations of nationalism, and it would be dramatic if Africa were in its turn to experience the civil wars that have marked the history of Europe and that of the decolonialization of the Latin American continent.

It is through a strengthening of their feeling of solidarity that the African states must expect to overcome the problem of the borders. Large entities have already been established (the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, the Council of the Entente, the Economic Community of West Africa, the Economic Community of the West African States, the Community of the Great Lakes, etc.), within which the African states are becoming aware of their complementary nature and noting that the development of the economy of each of them cannot be assured within the limits of its own borders. At the same

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they are sensing the need to avoid entrusting foreign forces with seeing to it that their territorial integrity is respected, and are acting accordingly.

In 1963, some years after independence was acquired, Africa had the wisdom to entrust the settlement of its conflicts to a supranational organization, the OAU. One of the great tasks of the African states will be that of giving the OAU more authority and powers. As for France, it supports and will continue to support all African initiatives toward the establishment of regional entities and will continue to support the action of the UN and the OAU.

At the close of his presentation, Mr Georgy cited an African proverb: "There is no good wind for the person who does not know where he wants to go." France has a clear vision of the aims of its African policy and of the principles on which it is based. Thanks to the ties that have bound it to Africa for decades, and in some cases for centuries, it has acquired a knowledge of African men and realities that predisposes it to explain to Africa and Europe that it is their destiny to become more and more closely involved with one another for their common good.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REPORTAGE ON CEDEAO, UMOA, OMVS ACTIVITIES

CEDEAO Activities

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3557

[Text] President Senghor and Security within CEDEAO

When Mr Haruma Bin Musa, the new ambassador from Nigeria to Dakar, presented his credentials 13 December, President Senghor seized the opportunity to propose that questions of security be added to those of cultural, economic, and financial cooperation with which CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community, which includes 16 countries] had been involved to the present.

The Senegalese head of state pointed out that his security, to be effective, should not be organized according to ideological differences, but along geographical and cultural affinities. In consideration of this, he emphasized that the member countries of CEDEAO "constitute a geographically, culturally, and economically solid bloc", and the spirit of method, organization, and brotherhood of this group "is an example for all Africa."

Mr Senghor added that the CEDEAO summit, which will be in Dakar the first two weeks in May, will mark an important step in the life of this organization.

Chambers of Commerce Wish to be Consulting Organ

During its sixth conference, which was held during the International Dakar Fair at the beginning of December, the West African Federation of Chambers of Commerce expressed the wish to become the consulting organ of CEDEAO.

Mr Issa Diop from Senegal was charged with presenting this request to the CEDEAO Council of Ministers, which will meet again in Dakar next May. The Federation, which includes 13 countries of West Africa, has also elected its new officers and adopted its laws. The new officers are presided over by Mr Koffi Djondo from Togo, and his deputies are Chief A.O. Lawson from Nigeria, Mr Barou from Ivory Coast, and Mr Maturi from Sierra Leone. Issa Diop was elected General Treasurer and Mr Pierre Njie his deputy.

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UMOA Activities

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3557

[Text] Loans from FRG and the Swiss

By the terms of a contract signed 21 December at Lome, the German Development Company (DEG) with headquarters at Cologne, granted a loan of DM 10 million (about 1 billion 150 million CFA francs to the West African Development Bank (BOAD) with headquarters at Lome.

This sum is allotted for the financing of industrial and agri-industrial projects, to be carried out in the member states of the West African Monetary Union (UMOA, which includes Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). The loan is granted at an interest rate of 7 percent per year for a period of 12 years.

The Swiss government has also granted BOAD a loan totaling 9.25 million Swiss francs (about 1,193,250,000 CFA francs and a gift of .75 million Swiss francs (about 96.75 million CFA francs).

The loan, which is granted for a period of 16 years, with a 6-year grace period and a rate of 2 percent per year, will be used by the bank for the financing of development projects. Preference will be given to the most needy peoples of the member countries of UMOA. The gift will be used to finance studies initiated by the bank and for Swiss technical assistance.

The Lome press release which announced the news specified that the loan agreement had been signed 20 December 78 at Abidjan by the Swiss ambassador to Abidjan, Mr Roch, and by Pierre Claver Damiba, president of BOAD.

Ministerial Conference at Abidjan

A UMOA ministerial conference was held at Abidjan 19-20 December, with ministers of finance from six member countries participating.

Two principal questions were discussed: the allocation of the profits of the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) during the fiscal year 1977/1978 and the level of assistance which the bank will allocate to the financing of the economic development of the six countries involved.

OMVS Activities

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3557

[Text] Council Sets 1979 Budget at 432 Million CFA Francs

During its tenth session 18-20 December at Bamako, the council of ministers of the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS) has set the 1979 budget for the organization at 432,094,809 CFA francs.

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The final communique of the session indicated that the council of ministers who prepared the summit of 21 December have also given instructions that "the pre-selection decision of the Manantali dam be made as soon as possible, and that the work on the Diama dam begin during the last half of 1979." The council also "adopted the fiscal and tariff policies applicable to the progressing studies and works which allow cutting costs of the substructure of the bases of the two dams." In addition, it has submitted for approval by the heads of state the draft agreement concerning the legal status of joint projects.

President Senghor's Remarks on the OMVS Summit

Following up the work of the Council of Ministers, the 21 December summit of the OMVS heads of state adopted two legal texts which define the extent of the future involvement of the organization. After having participated in the summit, President Leopold S. Senghor indicated on his return that the summit marked a "point of no return." The Senegalese head of state recalled that the necessary financing for the two dams has been secured (MTM 17 Nov 78 p 3027). The laying of the cornerstone of the Manantali dam will take place during the first half of 1980. It is expected that the total project will produce 800 million KWh, irrigate 300,000 hectares of farmland, and make the river navigable from Kayes to its mouth at Saint Louis in Senegal.

The cost of finishing the first phase of this project which extends to 1985 is estimated at 750 million dollars, of which 460 million is for Manantali and Diama and 290 million is for the agricultural cultivation of irrigated lands.

According to President Senghor the two documents signed 21 December are an amendment to the OMVS charter to reassure the investors, and a declaration making the constructions the common property of the three member states (Senegal, Mali, Mauritania). According to the Senegalese president "no threat of disharmony is hovering over the organization". Finally, it is noted that the Mauritanian head of state, Col Ould Saleck, will succeed Gen Moussa Traore from Mali as president of the organization.

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AFRICAN CROP PLANNING CRITICIZED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Dec 78-3 Jan 79 pp 61-64

[Article by Sophie Bessis: "Food Crops, Disliked by Planners"]

[Text] Feeding is a worsening African problem. However, all investments go to export products.

Drought in the Sahel, famine in Ethiopia, emergency aid to Somalia, considerable shortages in Nigeria, bigger rice and wheat imports to most of the countries on the continent. . . . Despite all development programs food production is not increasing in Africa and the shortage seems to be worsening with every passing year. Is it weather ill luck? Or extensive negligence on the part of those in charge of the vital sector which, however, has the inconvenience of increasing state revenue poorly? Probably, both.

According to the FAO, African food production rose by no more than 0.5 percent per year between 1971 and 1975. Between 1976 and 1977 it did not increase at all. Per capita production dropped 2.1 percent per year between 1971 and 1975 reaching a 94 index in 1976 compared with 100 as set for 1961-1965. This is alarming situation for a continent whose population is growing rapidly and which, in fact, has all the necessary potential to meet the food requirements of its population.

The little interest displayed in basic food crops and peasant production has resulted in the stagnation or regress of a large share of so-called traditional crops: Hard wheat and barley in North Africa, millet and sorghum in the Sahel-Sudan area, and roots and tuber crops in the rain part of Africa. Investments and the necessary production factors for a rapid increase in output have been focused exclusively on products raised within the framework of a more modern agriculture, basically aimed at urban markets--rice, soft wheat, and sugar, essentially. Actually, if the rural population--about four-fifths of the total population of the southern part of Africa and the Sahara, and 55 percent of North Africa--would raise in a normal year the food needed for its consumption, it would no longer be capable, today, to meet a very rapidly rising urban demand.

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Alarming Situation for a Continent Which, in Fact, Could Meet its Food Requirements

The food problem in Africa is not, as one might wish to believe, the consequence of some sort of over-population but rather that of the far more rapid growth of the urban compared with the total population. At the present time the urban population is rising by five percent per year as against 1.7 percent in the rural areas. This situation has a substantial effect on agriculture which is thus deprived of manpower.

Root and tuber crops are the basic staples of the moist tropical areas. The two most important crops among them are manioc and yam. However, recently a number of other crops such as sweet potatoes and taro have been added to them. Since such vegetables are not extensively sold, it would be hard to determine their annual output. Crop surpluses, if such exist, could be preserved with difficulty over the year and delivered to urban markets.

All such items account for most of the food production in the countries involved; for example, they account for 60 percent of the nutrition of the Ivory Coast population. The Ivory Coast produces about 4.5 million tons of root and tuber crops per year and hopes to reach 5.5 million tons by 1980 thanks to a series of measures aimed at encouraging production. Cameroon intends to double its output in the course of the current plan, increasing it from 3.2 million tons in 1974-1975 to 6.2 million tons in 1980-1981, particularly by tripling yam production. However, this target seems to be more in the nature of a pious wish considering how modest investments allocated to this sector are. In Zaire the production of manioc is in the vicinity of 12 million tons per year and should be raised, one is not quite certain how, to 13.5 million tons by 1980. Other countries such as Congo or Cameroon are organizing large agroindustrial units for manioc growing, part of whose byproducts will be used for human consumption.

Actually manioc is the only feculent root which is beginning to be discovered. Very productive varieties have been developed and new uses are being regularly discovered. Brazil appears even to have discovered a way to use it as fuel! However, the new interest created in manioc is essentially due to the possibility to be used, after processing, as cattle fodder.

Would this be a confirmation of the rule according to which tropical crops draw attention only if they can satisfy the needs of developed countries? For the time being everything confirms that this may be the case.

Secondary crops are also important to the nutrition of African populations and pose acute problems of a different nature. Other than corn, raised more or less everywhere, they cover the low precipitation areas, from the

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Sudan-Sahel to the Maghreb area, and react to the whims of the weather. Africa produces about 25 million tons of millet and sorghum per year almost all of which goes to local consumption. No more than 10 percent of the overall output is marketed.

In most of the Sahel countries "plans for integral rural development" are relied upon for purposes of increasing output, linking cash with table crops and, to the extent of possibilities, the growing on the side of compatible crops. It is thus hoped that the efforts made to grow peanuts or cotton, to which the virtually total amount of fertilizer and plant protection facilities go, and that efforts to develop and make available new more productive technologies would indirectly benefit the production of foodstuffs. Therefore, all the cotton-growing areas in Africa, from west of the Chad to Senegal, have been subjected to integrated development.

Even though, here and there, a certain amount of encouraging progress and increased crop yields have been noted, overall the experiment does not seem to be conclusive, for no single Sudan-Sahelian country has been able to cover its food shortages which worsened this year even further. It is true that precipitation was irregular. However, the drought which has been frequently blamed for the past few years is not reason enough to explain the persistent shortages in the area.

However, would this trend be reversed with the new orientation of the World Bank, followed by the main Western fund suppliers who are henceforth giving priority in their financing to the development of food crops and which channel into this sector a greater share of their investments? It is still too soon to determine this. Meanwhile, the prospects are far from brilliant. Another hope, as yet weak, is developing in the area of agricultural research which, after having long neglected traditional crops in favor of rice and wheat, is beginning to develop more productive strains which could raise yields by one-half.

Finally, corn is grown everywhere in Africa: Out of an overall annual output of about 20 million tons, over three-quarters is consumed in the rural areas. Development efforts should focus above all on conservation and stockpiling, as warehousing losses in some areas reach nearly one-quarter of the crop.

Other than in Madagascar and some other areas, rice is not a traditional African food crop. Its annual production is no more than some four million tons. The wheat situation is similar: In Black Africa only two countries --Sudan and Ethiopia--have a wheat output in excess of 100,000 tons.

However, the very high increase in urban demand, the fact that this output is almost entirely marketed, and the earning of foreign exchange from massive exports to countries which have become very big consumers have considerably developed wheat and rice growing which, for some 10 years, have been the beneficiaries of substantial investments.

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Furthermore, the type of urban consumption is becoming ever more different from rural consumption, influenced even further by the West, thus contributing to the creation of new needs. Therefore, the governments begin to pay far greater importance to the new crops and lose interest in rural food production, thus creating a situation which, in many respects, could become explosive.

In the Maghreb most of the arable area is efficiently cultivated and the solution of the problem, therefore, lies in the combined development of irrigation, productivity, and the production of crops better suited to meet the population's needs. South of the Sahara, however, the entire soil and water potential is far from being fully utilized: Less than one-half of the arable land in the area is under cultivation, and irrigation is only embryonic. It is, therefore, possible to increase food production considerably, particularly if it is, once and for all, allocated the most fertile land, which is still far from being the case.

Is it known that in 1971, one of the worst droughty seasons, the Sahel countries exported 15,000 tons of out-of-season vegetables to Europe? Scarcity, therefore, is not a fatality, and providing that current talk of self-sufficiency marks the beginning of a real awareness and of increased efforts in this area, everyone agrees that it could be eliminated. Conversely, if the current trend, i.e., a modest annual increase in food production goes on, by 1985 Western African would have to import 6.8 million tons of foodstuffs, four million tons by Nigeria alone, and one million by the Sahelian countries. coastal countries such as the Ivory Coast would also turn into regular purchasers. Central Africa will be importing 500,000 tons of cereal crops annually while Eastern Africa will be importing 700,000. In the Maghreb the two main importers will be Morocco and Algeria, one million tons each. As to Egypt, by 1985 it will have to import 2,750,000 tons of cereal crops to meet its requirements.

Rice is developing everywhere at the expense of traditional foodstuffs and it is considered that in Africa it may soon assume first place in urban food consumption if such is already not the case. Considerable investments have been made in rice growing: In Cameroon the 1976-1981 plan calls for an overall investment of 20.8 billion CFA francs in the food sector, some 12 billion or nearly 60 percent, in rice which is the beneficiary of important foreign financing, French above all. In the Ivory Coast 17 billion CFA francs will have been invested in rice production during the 1976-1980 plan. In Senegal, the SAED, a state company in charge of developing the delta and valley of the Senegal River, essentially for purposes of rice cultivation, is planning an overall investment of nearly 30 billion CFA francs between 1977 and 1981; four-fifths will be financed by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, the World Bank, etc. As to the major irrigation farming projects of the fluvial and lacustral basins of the Sudan-Sahel area--Senegal, Gambia, Niger, the Voltas, Logone, Chari, and Lake Chad--a substantial share of their future irrigated areas will be used to grow rice and wheat.

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In fact, great priority is being given to wheat in virtually all farming programs of Black African countries: Africans are eating more and more bread. From Cameroon to the Sudan areas in wheat will be expanded 10-fold in the course of the next few years: Senegal and Cameroon hope to produce 30,000 tons each by 1981 compared with virtually no production today; Sudan hopes to raise its output from 340,000 to 670,000 tons by 1983, etc. These are two crops the final word about which has not been said.

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MALI, SENEGAL INTENSIFYING COOPERATION

London REUTER in French 0247 GMT 13 Feb 79 PA

[Text] Bamako, 12 Feb (REUTER)--The governments of Senegal and Mali have reached "total agreement" on intensifying cooperation between the two countries, Mr Abdoulaye Amadou Sy, Mali's minister of transportation and public works, announced on Monday.

The two governments agreed on the need to grant the businessmen of Senegal the right to import industrial products from Mali in accordance with decisions of the CEAO (West African Economic Community). They also decided to further the integration of their railroad systems and promote the creation of an international [word indistinct] to Kidira as well as to search for financing of the Tambacounda-Kayes route.

Mr Abdoulaye Sy noted that Senegal is willing to grant Mali new storage facilities at the port of Dakar. He added that he had delivered a message from Gen Moussa Traore to President Senghor.

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BRIEFS

NEW MILITARY PUBLICATION--The first issue of the REVUE AFRICAINE DE STRATEGIE has just appeared. This quarterly publication is published in Paris by the Cible Company. It costs 20 francs. The new periodical is chiefly addressed to rank-and-file Africans and political and economic leaders. The journal says it is open to new ideas, but refuses to be a political rostrum. The project started from a simple established fact: the lack of specialized, manifold and available information. "Military information is one of the forms of dissuasion, a modern expression of the war against war." Its purpose is to make known "the facts that determine whether there will be war or peace, from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Cape"; such is the undertaking of the journal, which intends to remain independent. The contents of the first issue: an exclusive interview with Gen Eyadema, president of the Togolese Republic and a scorching dossier on the South African military machine with this attention-getting title: "Is the South African Army Invincible?" Finally, and this is the great original feature of the REVUE AFRICAINE DE STRATEGIE, two digests, one in English and the other in Arabic, conclude the publication. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 27 Dec 78-3 Jan 79 p 75] 8946

CEDEAO DISPUTE--In the CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community] the torch is burning between the Ivorian Diaby Ouattara, secretary general, and one of his deputies, the Liberian Romeo Horton, director of the Organization's Development Fund. In order to unravel the crisis, some chiefs of CEDEAO member states have asked the president of Liberia, William Tolbert, to recall his compatriot. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 27 Dec 78-3 Jan 79 p 27] 8946

ACCT DISPUTE--The board of directors of the Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency experienced some agitated hours during the night of 13-14 December in Paris. Several so-called scandalous affairs were brought up. The most serious, raised by Bernard Dadie, Ivorian Culture Minister, concerns a letter sent by one of the deputy secretaries, the Tunisian Abdelaziz Driss, to President of Benin Matthieu Kerekou. It accused the Beninese minister of Youth and Popular Sports, Francois Kouyami, by name. At the end of September Francois Kouyami gave his agreement to Secretary General Dan Dicko to withdrawing financial autonomy from his deputies. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 27 Dec-3 Jan 79 p 27] 8946

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CEDEAO INTERNAL CONFLICT--The dispute within the CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community] which opposes its secretary general, Diaby Ouattara (Ivory Coast) to the director of the organizations's development fund, Romeo Horton (Liberia), seems to have reached the point of no-return. Failing to secure the recall of his countryman by Liberian President William Tolbert, the Ivorian head of state, Felix Houphouet-Boig , reportedly decided, short of some new development in the case, to recall Diaby Ouattara. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Jan 79 p 29] 2662

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ANGOLA

WHY ANGOLA MUST STILL RELY ON WESTERN COOPERATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 pp 121-124

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "The Difficulties of Angola's Economic Transformation"]

[Text] "France is gradually becoming an enemy which may attack Angola at any time," Agostinho Neto stated a few months ago. This judgment reflected the attitude of the French Government at the time of the Shaba affair. To a certain extent, it did later prove to be justified. But it now seems to be invalidated by the efforts of Luis de Almeida, ambassador of the People's Republic of Angola to Brussels and Paris, to normalize relations between Luanda and Paris (see MARCHES TROPICAUX, 24 November 1978, p 3801: "France's Chances in Angola").

Angola's economic orientation is no less difficult to determine based on its internal activities and the remarks of its leaders. On 30 October 1976, Agostinho Neto said at a meeting that the country could not be considered independent as long as Angolan oil, diamonds and iron were not totally under the control of the government. At the same time, he emphasized the generosity of the Soviet and Cuban aid, contrasting it with the self-seeking nature of Western cooperation. It is true that he meant that of the multinational companies, the only ones active in Angola. "The private enterprises that still exist will have to pack their bags," Lucio Lara, political secretary of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), stated in May 1977. The secretary general of the National Union of Workers of Angola (UNTA) went even further in 1978, demanding the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transfer of all means of production to the people. These radical statements would henceforth be opposed by the numerous overtures made toward and the transactions granted to European and American enterprises.

The social framework within which Angola's activities fit, whether it be a question of mining, industry or agriculture, gives rise, in the final analysis, to divergent interpretations, depending on the political hue of those making them. Some say that what one has is the task of building socialism, backed by the self-sacrifice and enthusiasm of the people. Others claim that it

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is a society stricken by economic cataclysm and most of whose driving forces have disappeared. The only economic sectors operating are those in which Westerners are tolerated because they are indispensable to production.

If judgments differ in these three domains, it is because just as in the case of the Spanish, or Portuguese, inns, many observers find in Angola only what they take there. It is also probably because the situation in itself is complex and contradictory. One must exclude value judgments to the maximum extent possible and then examine the facts, classifying them into fairly predominant categories. This method does not enable one to give definitive evaluations of the current situation of the future orientations of the Republic of Angola, but at least it has the merit of pointing up certain anomalies.

Civil War

Information released about the recent reconciliation of Mobutu and Neto might lead one to think that the main adversaries of the Luanda government: the FNLA (Angolan National Liberation Front) of Holden Roberto, and the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) of Jonas Savimbi, lacking all financial and logistical support, are now neutralized and that normal air, road and telephone communications have now been restored between the capital and the chief towns of the provinces.

Actually, if the reconciliation is in fact confirmed, the activities of the FNLA, which remains all-powerful in the eastern provinces of Malanje and Lunda, will necessarily have to be reduced. On the other hand, it would not appear that the UNITA would suffer from it. Solidly organized in its sanctuaries in the southeastern province of Cuando-Cubango, its intentions are purely military, unlike the FNLA, which is based on political indoctrination and the maintenance of a parallel administration.

Backed by 12,000 relatively well-armed and well-trained men and a substantially equal number of auxiliary forces, undoubtedly supplied from Namibia, endowed with missiles, mortars and recoilless guns made in China, the UNITA carries out lightning raids on the Benguele railroad in Rio and Monico provinces and inflicts light damage whose repair provides opportunities for murderous ambushes. It is difficult to make a precise evaluation of the effectiveness of the UNITA's actions. Nevertheless, it will be noted that the reopening of the railroad, which would be of more obvious interest to Zaire and which was scheduled for November, since the bridges have been repaired for months, has not yet come about, despite official reassurances. Likewise, protection of the Calueque Dam in Cunene Province on the Namibian border, provided for a time by Cuban troops, was interrupted at the same time as the work.

The very existence of an Angolan army of 50,000 men, including armored vehicles and planes, flanked by a Cuban expeditionary corps of 24,000 men, all commanded by a Soviet general, could scarcely be justified if the Angolan "Vendee" could henceforth be considered inoffensive.

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In addition to this armed opposition, from which only the coastal provinces, Mocamedes, Benguele, southern and northern Cuanza, Zaire and the coffee province of Uige in the north are truly safe, the government is faced with a factional opposition within the MPLA, whose leaders were arrested at the time of Nito Alves' attempted putsch but which continues to remain active through the two underground organizations called Revolta Activa and Revolta do Leste. The official bulletins which accompanied the recent resignation of the prime minister, six members of the Cabinet and two high officials are eloquent proof of its persistence. There is no news of the leaders of the abortive coup: Nito Alves, Cita Alves and Jose Van Dunem. The number of political prisoners, never precisely known, probably remains high despite the amnesty measures periodically announced.

On the whole, the atmosphere is one of civil war, varying in intensity depending on the region. It is revealed, even in Luanda, by supply difficulties and the lines before public food stores. Aga Khan's appeals on behalf of the refugees abroad, the Church's opposition to violations of individual rights, the closing of church schools and the ban on Radio Ecclesia are other manifestations of the situation.

This country at war is also an occupied country. Even here, one can profess contradictory opinions on the motives for the Russian or Cuban aid. But the presence of foreign soldiers is a fact and it is also a fact that it lacks discretion. In Luanda, the homes and apartments in residential areas are requisitioned by the Russian and Cuban officers. They live in a closed circuit with an autonomous supply system that makes them privileged persons compared with the poor urban proletariat, a little like the American army in the large cities of France and Italy at the end of World War II. There is undoubtedly no reason to be shocked by it but it is equally difficult to prevent the fact that in the eyes of the population, this foreign caste, which replaces another in the same dominant situation, is assimilated with it.

Contracts and Bargains

The choice of Angola's customers and suppliers is a priori without any connection with the choice of the country's economic structures and options. In this field, customs, transportation, buying channels, and international processing and sales circuits hold sway and political orientations emerge only intangibly. This is not the case, however, when it is a question of the sale of technology or partnership with foreign firms. It is quite remarkable that most of the contracts concluded are with Western firms, no matter how many Soviet advisers are posted in the technical ministries.

It would seem natural, for example, for Angolan civil aviation, following the example of its military aviation, to have Soviet equipment. This is not the case. TAAG, the National Air Transport Company, purchased four Boeings (707's and 737's) for its international routes in 1976 and 1977. Alitalia has assumed responsibility for training Angolan technical personnel. The firm of Astaldi Estero is doing expansion work on the Luanda airport. The SESC

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[expansion unknown] Airport Engineering of Milan is building a 3,700-meter-long runway in Catumbela. It will be the second longest in the country.

In the field of mining, the Angolan Government is negotiating with a Swedish firm, Granges International, which would take over the operations of the former Lobito Mining Company. The national company SONANGOL [expansion unknown], which has a theoretical monopoly over oil operations, is actually granting prospecting concessions to over 20 foreign companies, including the ENI-AGIP [National Hydrocarbons Agency-Italian National Oil Company], a latecomer but the most active firm, which is training Angolan oil technicians in Milan.

Concerning automotive vehicles, large orders placed with Brazil Volkswagen (475 vehicles) and Volvo (950 heavy trucks) counterbalance the supplying of 500 trucks by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. A \$6 million contract has just been concluded with the French firm Titan, Inc., for the setting up of a tank truck and vehicle assembly line in partnership with the Duarte Ferreira Metallurgical Company of Lisbon.

This brief enumeration of the most recent transactions between the Angolan Government and Western enterprises shows that no one is excluded. Actually, it is the financial difficulties afflicting the country that check its reconstruction. Curiously enough, the role of the USSR is limited to the sector of maritime fishing. Here, as in South Yemen, the Russians have made a major effort: 10 boats, 10,000 facilities for cold-storage workers, 100 radio communications apparatuses, 20 refrigerated trucks, without mentioning the deliveries of fish (20,000 tons of frozen fish and 10,000 tons of fresh fish in 1977) to supply the population. Also as in South Yemen, they have received something in return in the establishment of a joint fishing venture whose articles of association provide them with 80 percent of all catches. The Soviets' efforts to penetrate the diamond production and sales circuits have been fruitless. The Cubans seem to have taken over the former sugar company Bom Jesus, which is now an Angolan-Cuban friendship enterprise, but it is a mini operation whose production is only 3,000 tons.

Current Resources

In order to understand the singular situation which results in the fact that the massive aid provided by the USSR and Cuba in the military field and even in the social and medical areas is not accompanied by any manifestation of major economic cooperation, one must recall that the former mother country, whose custom it was to present Angola as a land where the Portuguese people had long settled -- a halfway fallacious presentation because it was not until a recent date and under the Salazar government that the emigration of settlers was organized and their number never exceeded half a million -- actually operated through large international companies, using methods long abandoned by the other European nations in their African colonial domains.

The nationalization of some of these companies gave rise to great hopes. Actually, in the best of cases, it resulted in the replacement of the former

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private employer by the government, while structures remained the same and working conditions grew worse due to the scarcity of upper-level personnel and the destruction of equipment. Difficulties were even worse in the case of nationalizations due to a simple abandonment by the former operating companies. The failure of the USSR and Cuba to provide support under such circumstances gave rise to a disappointment equal in dimension to the hopes which the intervention of these two countries had created.

It is striking to note, in the capital of the international companies that have heretofore ensured -- and to a large extent, still seem to ensure, in new forms -- the working of the three main resources of the Angolan subsoil: oil, diamonds and iron, the involvement of European and American firms. Gulf Oil, which operates the Cabinda offshore deposits, is part of the Mellon group and is linked to the interests of Alcoa, Koppers and Westinghouse. With its production of 1 million tons of crude oil in 1973, it was already supplying 50 percent of Angola's foreign exchange. Today, with a production of 7 million tons, it provides nearly 85 percent of the oil exports in terms of value and 60 percent of the government's income.

The halting of its operation in December 1976 was reversed in May 1977 since neither of the two parties had any interest in prolonging the hiatus. The negotiations undertaken between Gulf and the Angolan Government tend to give SONANGOL 50 percent of the capital and should soon be concluded inasmuch as there does not seem to be any solution enabling Angola to work its oil while doing without the American company.

A number of oil companies were nationalized on behalf of SONANGOL and brought into PETRANGOL [Angola Petroleum Company], which links PETROFINA [expansion unknown], a Belgian company connected with Shell, with French and American companies, and which works the land areas of the Cuanza and Cuango areas and the maritime zone of Cuanza, with a production of about 1 million tons. But SONANGOL remains a management company with government participation. It does not have the technical means to ensure operations and the USSR did not supply them.

The same is true of diamonds. The Diamang trust, whose capital includes, along with the Burnay and Neuflyze-Schlumberger banks, the General Company of Belgium, the Ryan and Guggenheim firms, the Diamond Corporation and the Anglo-American Corporation (Oppenheimer and De Beers), will henceforth have government participation amounting to 61 percent of the capital. But the government's share is made up of the buying back of 852,000 shares of small shareholders and has not affected the 21 foreign companies which, with a few modifications involving the administration exercised by the trust within the concessions, continue to have control of technical management. Moreover, the companies in charge of the marketing of production remain in foreign, particularly South African, hands. (National revenue from diamonds was equivalent to 25 billion CFA francs in 1974.)

Iron production, mainly located in the region of Menongue and Cassinga, was 9 million tons in 1973, including the attached deposit of Cassola. Operations

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were completely shut down in 1975. The English, French, Japanese, South African, American and Swedish interests rub elbows in the same mining company. The Benguela railroad, which before independence carried all of Zaire's copper and 49 percent of Zambia's production and whose reopening has been postponed month after month by the UNITA sabotage, is itself 90-percent owned by an English company, Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd., which has now become Tanks Consolidated Investment. Considering the closure of the line since 1975 and the company's failure to pay its debts -- it paid no dividends in recent years -- one can understand why the Angolan Government is not in a hurry to ensure its nationalization.

Another example of the government's hesitation to nationalize is furnished in the cement sector, in which Secil Ultramar was taken over only to the extent of the 29 percent held by the parent company Secil of Portugal and the shares owned by small shareholders. Furthermore, it did not touch foreign participation -- particularly Danish shares -- and negotiations are even underway with a Swedish firm to have it buy back part of the capital. It had previously supplied technical assistance.

In sum, when one examines the strategy of the Angolan Government in the mining and industrial fields, one notes that the rather precarious equilibrium of its balance of payments is obtained only through the activity of foreign companies which, under fairly relaxed control and with capital participation mainly stemming from the nationalization of stock held by small shareholders, ensure production that is substantially equivalent to what it was before independence, except for iron, in which the delay has not been rectified.

The government allows a foreign private sector to subsist. With drops in production on the order of 20 to 50 percent compared with the 1960's, the sector maintains the minimal indispensable activities in the areas of edible oils, soap, tobacco, rubber, electrical equipment and even road work. A few nationalized enterprises -- rather rare in number, as previously noted -- receive Russian or Cuban capital aid and technical assistance. The number of economic undertakings that are strictly Angolan is very limited.

Another category of nationalized enterprises is the one resulting from their outright abandonment by European owners and managers. In the vast majority of cases, the resumption of these businesses encounters insurmountable difficulties having to do with operating funds, supplies of raw materials and management. The capital which they represent for the state in terms of real property and equipment is depreciating due to the abundance of supply and the scarcity of demand and they still constitute a heavy burden due to maintenance costs.

These structures, whose collapse makes it difficult to get industry on its feet again without the help of foreign techniques and capital, are also unfortunately in the agricultural field, particularly the coffee sector, whose production was Angola's second-ranking export in 1973, coming after oil. Angola was in third place among the African producers and in fifth place in the world, with a total of 5,755,000,000 escudos (or kwanzas, to

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use the terminology adopted since the conversion of the currency in January 1977), or some 41 billion CFA francs.

This crop was 90 percent concentrated in the provinces of Uige and South Cuanza and also North Cuanza and Cabinda. It was raised on 500 plantations or fazendas ranging in size from 300 to 500 hectares on the average and belonging to Portuguese companies such as the Angolan Agricultural Company. Established in regions which had a low population density, coffee growing depended greatly on the contract recruitment of 100,000 seasonal workers in the southern provinces by the territorial authorities. Most of the plantations were nationalized when the former owners abandoned them and in the case of 386 of them, the government had to take over their management, trying, without great success, to reestablish the seasonal contracts and trying to send unemployed workers and "volunteers" from the urban centers to the plantations.

It is difficult to know what tonnages were produced by these expedients, which the atmosphere of civil war could hardly have facilitated. The government puts them at 37 percent of the 1975-1976 figure, or some 80,000 tons. Tonnages of unprocessed timber, cottonseed, tobacco and sugar cane, which along with coffee were the main export products, suffered the same declines. This is also true of lumbering, which was one of the resources of the Cabinda enclave.

Economic Policy of USSR in Angola

In an article published here in October 1975, we wrote that the disorders to be feared from the Angolan independence were more comparable to those that might result from a sudden resignation of upper-level personnel in Rhodesia than to the convulsions of the former Belgian Congo, whose population was, proportionately speaking, less engaged in the market economy.

The facts have only half confirmed the prediction since in the case of the big companies at least, the European personnel remained in Angola, albeit in smaller numbers, except in provinces in a state of dissidence or semi-dissidence. This situation results from the apparent inability, or even unwillingness, of the USSR to assume the social and technical responsibilities of the European capitalist entrepreneur and is the most remarkable fact of this period.

If it is a question of unwillingness, it can be explained, insofar as oil operations are concerned, by the desire not to develop sources of supply whose use would be reserved for the West because of Angola's geographical situation. One can see the cause in the refusal to assume unpopular responsibilities in the place of the multinational companies. Finally, one can take the position that by so doing, the USSR intends to limit its action in Africa to strategic objectives. But its attitude is much more likely the result of a lack of available exportable capital and technology.

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Whatever the true motives, this attitude has important consequences. It explains the reproaches addressed to Podgorny by Julius Nyerere when Podgorny was visiting Tanzania. It is at the root of the upheavals in the MPLA and the revolt of factions that were disappointed to see that the departure of the Portuguese colonial power basically changed nothing in Angola, but rather, accelerated the drops in tonnage and the yields of agricultural production. Finally, it furnishes an explanation for the West's advances toward a government which, whatever its political options, is forced to seek the aid on which its very existence depends from those who are not its allies.

It is not a question here of overburdening a people long the victim of anachronistic exploitation or of denigrating what are after all praiseworthy efforts of its leaders to pull the country out of an underdevelopment which, behind a sometimes brilliant facade, constituted its daily reality. Is the solution therefore one of being content to use government participation in joint ventures to temper the methods of the past, instead of building a new economy endowed with intermediate structures? There is a great gap between the fairly free work of imported workers, albeit in the name of socialism, on the Angolan plantations and the direct interest of the Ivorian producer in developing his production, structured into cooperatives and guaranteed against the fluctuation in world prices by stabilization organizations.

If this is the type of support that the Angolan Government is seeking, French cooperation could well supply it. Likewise, its future membership in the Euro-African Lome association would undoubtedly be better adapted to its needs than a rallying to COMECON, which, moreover, it has just rejected.

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BENIN

ACTION OF ENEMIES OF REVOLUTION REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 Dec 78 pp 26, 35-36

[Article by Mariam Sysle: "Serious New Threats"]

[Text] In order to spread confusion, to trick the vigilance of the African peoples and to prepare the way for a new attack, the enemies of the revolution have invented a document which is a complete forgery. But...

Last 30 November the Beninese people celebrated the third anniversary of their national holiday, which coincides, as we know, with the founding on 30 November 1975 of the People's Republic of Benin and the creation on the same date of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB), the spear-head organization called upon at that time to guide and direct the activities of the country.

At the same time, the national holiday reminds us inevitably of two other important events which blazed the trail for the progress of the Beninese revolution: the Goho speech, on 30 November 1974, in which the option of the socialist path was proclaimed and, 2 years earlier to the day, the policy statement which, 1 month after the launching (26 October 1972) of the revolution of the Beninese armed forces, with the support of the popular masses, proclaimed the goals of national liberation and true independence, which from then on were to be carried out.

Sobriety and revolutionary vigilance: those are the watchwords which, this year, reigned over the national holiday, to which a very democratic feeling was to be given also. This was how the demonstrations and festivities came to be held in the district centers of the 84 districts of the country, while a mass meeting, presided over by the chief of state had been organized the day before, in the Cotonou Hall of Sports, in the presence of members of the PRPB Central Committee, of the National Council of the Revolution and of the Revolutionary Military Government.

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Considerable Progress

These watchwords reflected, more or less, the situation the Beninese revolution finds itself facing. The progress made in only 6 years is, we know, considerable. In all areas, everyone is harnessed to destroy the former neo-colonial "order." National companies took charge of the key sectors of the economy, of finance and of insurance. And the reform of the territorial administration, which took place at the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974 has totally changed the sociopolitical face of the country. To bring together the administration and the people administered, to decentralize the decision-making power, to give the maximum responsibility to local groups: that was the goal of this reform.

Thus new structures were established at the provincial level--in which collective leadership is guaranteed by the state provincial administration committee (CEAP); at the district level--by the revolutionary committee of the district administration (CRAD) and at the community level, the neighborhood level or the village level--by the executive secretariat of the local revolutionary council (CRL). Each of these local groups was granted, at its own level, financial and corporate autonomy.

The recent creation of various provincial companies should contribute to increasing the responsibility and decision-making power of the local collectivities in the economic sphere and to permitting a greater coordination of activities at the regional level. Let us remember again that the leadership of the local collectivities--with the exception of the regional prefects and the district chiefs, who are appointed by the central government--are elected democratically by the people and are subject periodically to its review. Similarly, the local units of the National Revolutionary Council--the committee for the defense of the revolution (CDR), the committee for the organization of youth (COJ), the committee for the organization of women (COF)--have been set up. All these structures are privileged bodies in which the popular masses learn about democracy, about managing public affairs and where they acquire increased political consciousness and knowledge. Two phenomena, radically new compared to past practice, characterize all activities in Benin: the collective development of all new decisions and the permanent mobilization of the popular masses. This mobilization has as its simple but basic watchword, one which was immediately understood and put into practice by the people: rely on their own strength.

The tasks of national reconstruction have led to spectacular results; each year, we have seen throughout the country hundreds of schools, medical facilities, recreation centers or meeting halls, wells, trails and roads, dams, bridges, playing fields, built by the people themselves. The same is true for the qualitative and quantitative improvement in agricultural production, which is no longer left up to the peasants alone; each factory, bank or administration, each local or mass organization actually has its own field or center for cattle raising.

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The Main Accomplishments

In this new climate, there is an effort being made to change old habits, to introduce the use of animal power and mechanization and to encourage the peasants, under a voluntary system, to organize themselves in revolutionary organizations with a cooperative purpose (GRVC), while experimentation with agricultural cooperatives of the socialist type (CATS) is being tried. "Today," emphasized President Kerekou in his speech on 29 November in Cotonou, "we can say, unmistakably, that all social levels in our country, in Benin, eat well and have all they want."

This cursory review should not neglect the emergence of the new schools--this kind of school which is to be not only a center for preparation for active life and political and patriotic education, but also a production unit--nor the two main accomplishments of the past 2 years. We mean the first 3-year plan for economic development, the first year's segment of which (1978) has been by and large completed, in spite of gaps and shortages, in satisfactory fashion, and the Basic Law, which is to both reinforce the structures of the revolutionary regime and increase democratization and popular participation, in particular with the establishment of the National Revolutionary Assembly. On this subject, we know that a first step has been taken with the registration on the voter lists of the entire population old enough to vote.

This task, which was accompanied by a vast sensitizing campaign, was presented as a patriotic duty and the voter registration card will now serve, more or less, as an identity card. We are now getting ready for the second and decisive stage, that of choosing, under the palaver tree, that is by direct democracy, at the grassroots level, in each neighborhood and village, in each production center, candidates for unpaid positions as the people's commissioners to the ANR [National Revolutionary Assembly]. This is to say that the People's Republic of Benin has not only become an immense work site, it has also been transformed into a vast school for political and patriotic education, into a gigantic entrenched camp, where the watchword is: "Vigilance at every moment." This is how the courses in ideological, patriotic and generalized premilitary training are systematically conducted, at every level, with all levels of the population.

While the Beninese revolution is prepared to make a new leap forward, this concrete vigilance must necessarily be reinforced. Indeed, the enemies of the RPB [People's Republic of Benin] are far from having learned the lessons of the failure of all their attempts at destabilization and, especially, of the imperialist strike, led by a hundred or so mercenaries, headed by Bob Denard, on 16 January 1977. On the contrary, everything is going on as if that failure had increased their ill-temper toward the revolution which, although it is very young, has proven its profound acceptance by the masses, its irreversible character and no longer is afraid forcefully to affirm its undying support for all the struggles of national liberation which are going on in the Third World, from the Sahara to Zimbabwe, from Palestine to Namibia, from Dhofar to South Africa.

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And so, recently, the agents of imperialism circulated secretly, among certain African leaders, a document which claims to be political analysis and is cynically attributed to the central leadership of the PRPB. But it is a complete forgery, concocted in the den of imperialist subversion and which resembles to a "T" the document of "political analysis" abandoned in the "trunk of Colonel Maurin," after the hasty withdrawal of his mercenaries.

A Well-chosen Moment

The goal of this psychological operation is clear: to spread confusion, to trick certain African states so as to obtain their active complicity, or at least their guilty silence, should there be a new attack on the PRB.

All the information in the hands of the leadership of the Beninese revolution proves that this aggression is being actively planned with the help of local agents of imperialism and "other African traitors." That is why the political bureau of the PRPB Central Committee launched on 5 December an appeal to the vigilance of all the African leaders whom imperialism is trying to lead astray through this fraudulent document, while all the militants, all the local units of the National Council of the Revolution and of the party, all the mass organizations, the people's armed forces and security units were asked to keep themselves ready, throughout the country, to defend the fatherland and the revolution.

This is why the watchwords which galvanize our energies today are: "The fatherland or death!" and "the revolution or death!"

So it is not by mere chance that the threats which are seen abroad coincide with a resurgence, domestically, of intrigues and reactionary activities (a profusion of subversive tracts, defeatist propaganda, economic sabotage and even crimes).

All that comes, and is developing, at the moment when the struggle is intensifying and is spreading over several fronts. Against bureaucratization first of all, an old problem that colonization and the regime of national resignation which followed deeply planted in the civil service, certain elements of which persist in old practices. Against a certain confusion which developed over the role of the state and that of the party, and of the primacy of the latter. Therefore a campaign to enlist the support of militants who have proved themselves in the field in revolutionary action groups (GAR)--basic cells of the party--is now being conducted throughout the country so as to reinforce and broaden the bases of the PRPB. Earlier, in recent months, efforts were directed toward establishing everywhere, even in offices and factories, the mass organizations (CDR, COF, COJ, etc.) which are the satellites of the party.

The struggle is also being undertaken against the disastrous practices of feudalism, of fetishism, of witchcraft; against a plague, perhaps even more

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serious, which continues to afflict the national companies and production units. On this subject an appeal was made to the committees for the defense of the revolution, established everywhere, so that they might intervene, more resolutely and more effectively, with the purpose of wiping out once and for all bureaucratic, authoritarian and dishonest practices. Finally, we must get rid of a kind of lethargy, which appears here and there, due, most likely to the lack of experience and maturity of certain militants and also, perhaps, to the slowness which characterizes the establishment of the Basic Law.

But all these insufficiencies and persistent gaps, these defeatist tendencies, are systematically driven out and publicly disclosed, brought to the knowledge and attention of the popular masses, so as to be fought more effectively.

Therefore, the enemies of the Beninese revolution should have no illusions. In this country, where the name of Behanzin has never been forgotten, the peasants and workers in the towns are ready, at any moment, just as on that Sunday, 16 January 1977, to become mobilized for the defense, by any means, of their country and their revolutionary accomplishments.

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BURUNDI

NATION DEVELOPING AFTER LONG ECONOMIC, SOCIAL STAGNATION

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Jan-4 Feb 79 p 26

[Article by Paul Nwesi: "A Country That Is Coming Back to Life"]

[Text] Following a period of political renaissance, the Second Republic is settling down to the task of economic reconstruction.

The situation that prevailed in Burundi under the Micombero regime invited change in every sphere of activity. Because of the fact that the basic objective of the movement initiated on 1 November 1976 by the responsible elements of the army with the support of the progressive forces of the nation--a movement that led to establishment of the administration of President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza--was to bring about genuine social justice, certain measures were taken immediately following the advent of the Second Republic that were like winds of liberation blowing across our hills.

These measures included, for example, the elimination of the minimum personal tax--a "head tax" that had become a symbol of exploitation and repression. Concurrently, a system has been established that enables peasants not only to save for a rainy day but also to participate--at their modest level--in the process of investment.

Elimination of the ubugerewa¹--ending the centuries-old feudal patronage system--has had the effect of confirming the determination of the new regime to labor tirelessly in behalf of its people. Other action has been taken in this connection, as for example the decision to return to the national domain those state lands that had been transferred in an irregular manner, generally to high government officials and army officers. The increase in the price of coffee and cotton at the level of the producer has also benefited the peasants, with the result that their labor is now remunerative.

1. A form of forced labor resembling serfdom.

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Nothing, however, could be done without first purging the party apparatus, the machinery of government, and the magistracy. The fact is that UPRONA [National Unity and Progress Party], which represents the popular will and regards itself as the instrument for the transformation of structures and mental attitudes, was lacking in cadres who were dynamic and committed.

It was in this atmosphere of political renaissance that the government of the Second Republic developed a 3-year program of national reconstruction, together with a 5-year plan of economic and social development whose objectives are now in process of attainment. Inasmuch as implementation of this plan required major capital investment, the first step taken was to clean up the management of the public finances by eliminating the corrupt elements and placing severe restraints on the diversion of public funds. Foreign nationals who were past masters in speculation and corruption were expelled from the country, and bank accounts maintained in foreign countries by Burundian citizens were repatriated.

This plan--which exemplifies the determination of the Second Republic to rely first and foremost on its own resources and to consolidate national independence--accords agriculture a preeminent place. The initial object ve is to meet the food requirements of the population and intensify the growing of export crops.

To this end a Rumanian-Burundian Mixed Company for Agriculture (AGRIBUROM) has been formed to develop certain lands by the methods of intensive agriculture. For its part, the Fish Processing Plant Company (SUPOBU) is in the process of organizing the exploitation and marketing of the fishery resources of Lake Tanganyika.

In the industrial sector--because it is viewed as a sector that creates new employment opportunities--a number of national and mixed enterprises have been created. We may cite, for example, a textile complex now under construction at Bujumbura; a factory for the manufacture of farm implements; a plant for the processing of hides and skins; a national enterprise for producing lime and cement; and a Mixed Company for the Canning of Vegetable and Meat Products (SOMILEVIA). In the commercial sector, a decision has been taken to strengthen the National Trade Office for the purpose of combating periodic shortages and speculation, and the office has already opened branches in a number of trading centers. A Burundi Transportation Office (OTRABU) has also been created; it has already put into service a number of vehicles for the transportation of passengers and within the near future will also be placed in charge of the transportation of freight.

Two companies are engaged in the task of overcoming the geographical isolation of the country: INTRAO [International Transportation Company], which has been in existence for several months, and Air Burundi, an air transportation company. Among the projects undertaken in connection with the highway infrastructure are the asphaltting of certain national and regional routes, including among others the Kayanza-Kanyaru, Bujumbura-

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Matambara, Bujumbura-Cibitoka and Bujumbura-Nile headwaters highways. With respect to the sector of geology and mining we should also mention the formation of a Rumanian-Burundian Mixed Company (SONIBUROM), which has been placed in charge of research and exploitation, and the creation of the National Peat Office (ONATOUR).

Progress has also been achieved in the areas of housing, public health and education. A program for the construction of 500 dwellings is under way in the cities of Bujumbura, Gitaga and Ngozi. In the rural areas the aim is to induce the peasants to regroup themselves into villages, but this cannot be accomplished unless it is preceded by a campaign to heighten their awareness.

In the public health sector, the primary concern of the government has been the reequipping of the hospitals and dispensaries. In conclusion, we may mention that it is planned to replace traditional education with an original type of education based on the learning of a trade. A program for the establishment of 100 centers of polyvalent education is in process of implementation throughout the nation. A center where the physically handicapped can learn a trade has also been constructed.

This is, in brief outline, the new face of Burundi, a country that is coming back to life and developing its economy after many years--somer years--of lethargy and of economic and social stagnation.

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CHAD

FROLINAT LAUNCHES OFFENSIVE; ARADA FALLS

London REUTER in French 1345 GMT 19 Feb 79 PA

[Text] Paris, 19 Feb (REUTER)--Apparently profiting from the recent fighting in Ndjamena, the rebels of the National Front for the Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) have launched an offensive against several Chadian localities, of which Arada, which has fallen into their hands, and Biltine are in mideastern Chad, it was learned in Paris on Monday from a reliable source.

Arada and Biltine, north of Abeche, had been considered strongholds of Prime Minister Hissene Habre, whose "armed forces of the north" confronted the regular army (?last week) [words indistinct] capital.

The former FROLINAT chief had reconquered Arada after joining the regime in August.

At the side of the regular forces and the French contingent, (?it had been used) to prevent any new incursion of the Goukoni Oueddei rebels south of the cease-fire line (?agreed upon) in March in Libya, the line dividing Chad in two (?from) Lake Chad, in the west, to Abeche, in the east.

According to reports reaching Paris, Habre reportedly stripped Arada and Biltine to strengthen Abeche, where his forces, as in Ndjamena, opposed the regular army [word indistinct] week.

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COMORO ISLANDS

NEW BEN ALI CABINET INCLUDES FEW CHANGES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jan 79 p 41

[Article: "Salim Ben Ali Has Formed His New Government"]

[Text] Appointed prime minister on 22 December 1978 (see MTM of 29 December 1978, p 3575), Salim Ben Ali announced on 29 December the formation of his government in which few changes are noted compared to the Cabinet of his predecessor.

The former prime minister, Abdellahi Mohamed, was appointed Minister of State in charge of Justice, Moslem Affairs, Transportation, Tourism, and Foreign Trade.

Ali Mroudjae is continued in his position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, while Said Kafe retains the portfolio of Minister of Finance, Economy, and Planning.

Among the newcomers is Tara Maecha, appointed Minister in charge of Social Affairs, Public Health, National Education, Youth, and Sports.

Those who left the government include Said Hassan Said Hachim, formerly minister of production and industry, who was recently elected governor of Grande Comore.

The first Comorian Federal Assembly met on 29 December 1978 at Moroni under the presidency of Allaoui Sombe, dean by virtue of seniority. The latter stressed the democratic choice made by the new authorities since the accession of President Ahmed Abdallah to power.

On his part Salim Ben Ali, who attended the meeting, based his speech on the theme of unity and work.

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GABON

DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONVENTION RESOLUTIONS

London REUTER in French 1552 GMT 27 Jan 79 PA

[Text] Libreville, 27 Jan (REUTER)---The Gabonese Democratic Party convention today expressed its "absolute support for democratic and organized progressism."

It [word indistinct] resolutions on politics in general, financial and economic policies, the social and cultural sectors and the reform of institutions.

It asked the government to stop appointing [words indistinct] in public and private sectors and to eliminate the concentration of functions so as to "make a place for unemployed youths."

It advocated struggle against "boisterous and folkloric [as received] militancy to pave the way for a true civic spirit" as well as the elimination of "demagogy, informing, slander and the spreading of false rumors" from the ranks of the Political Bureau.

In regard to foreign policy, the congress reaffirmed Gabon's support for the OAU and UN charters and the declaration on human rights. It stressed its policy of nonalignment and its support for the African liberation movements recognized by the OAU as well as the Palestinians. It condemned racism and Zionism.

On the economic and financial situation, it recommended the adoption of "necessary measures" to develop the infrastructure and to favor investment in production sectors.

The congress also condemned the "deviations, distortions and other abnormal forms of behavior which harm the Gabonese mind and social structures" and recommended "working from the bases."

The congress will proceed during the day to elect members to the party's Central Committee.

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GABON

BRIEFS

NEW OILFIELD DISCOVERED--Libreville, 8 Feb (REUTER)--Gabonese Mines, Energy and Hydraulic Resources Minister Edouard-Alexis Mbouty-Boutzit confirmed on Wednesday that new oilfields had been discovered in Gabon. The importance of the find should be evaluated within 6 or 8 months. [London REUTER in French 1336 GMT 8 Feb 79 PA]

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GHANA

LIST OF PETROLEUM COMPANIES REVISED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3564

/Text/ The director of the Ghana Department of Geological Studies, Mr G.O. Kesse, recently gave some precise details on petroleum operations in Ghana in a lecture delivered in Kumasi before the Ashanti regional branch of the Ghana Association of Science Teachers. Retracing the history of the search for petroleum in his country, Kesse said that this search had begun in 1896 and that, in 1957, 17 boreholes had already been drilled. This number has increased today to 48, 28 offshore and 20 onshore. According to Kesse, five companies are carrying out operations: Agri-Petco International (Ghana) Inc, Phillips Petroleum, Texaco International, Offshore Hydrocarbon and J.J. Simmons Co. He cited neither Getty Oil nor AGIP, whom we had previously mentioned (MTM 27 November). With regards to Agri-Petco, without actually saying that up until now they were the only company to have started operations, he nevertheless stated that the agreement they had reached with the government had been in the best interests of Ghana. Under the terms of this agreement, he said, 12.5 percent of production is paid as royalties to the African state which, moreover, has the option of buying 50 percent of their production at world market prices. Kesse also indicated that bituminous coal deposits had been discovered in four very distinct locations: in the Tano basin, the Volta basin, the Keta zone and all along the coastal bank. The latter region has been divided into 22 parcels each of which may be leased, for a maximum exploration period of 2 years, at \$10,000, by any interested company.

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GHANA

BRIEFS

ROADS, EXPORT, BUSINESS FINANCING--The European Development Fund (EDF) has recently granted 74.6 million cedis in financing to Ghana for the completion of three types of projects. The first and principal project will receive 64.6 million cedis, including 46.7 million exempt from duties and 17.9 million in the form of a loan at 1 percent interest for 40 years with a 10-year deferment. It is for the 93-kilometer Axim-Mapataba-Eluho road, which is to become part of the Trans-West African highway. The section will include a bridge over the Tano, which the African Development Bank (BAD) and the Ghanaian Government have agreed to finance jointly. The second project will receive 3.6 million cedis and involves the development of exports. The sum will mainly be used by the Ghanaian Council for the Promotion of Exports and the Ghanaian Export Company. Finally, the third project, which will receive a 6.4-million-cedi loan under the same conditions as the previously mentioned 17.9-million credit, concerns the development of small and average-size industries. The amount of the loan will be jointly administered by the Bank of Ghana and the National Investment Bank. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 141] 11,464

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

FRENCH LOAN FOR DAM--In its 16 December meeting, the Council of the (French) Caisse centrale /Central Treasury/ for Economic Cooperation granted Guinea a loan of 1.3 million francs (about 6 million syllis), which will cover the entire cost of a study on the rebuilding of the Great Falls Dam, which supplies water and electricity to Conakry. This is the first operation the Caisse centrale has carried out in Guinea since that country's independence in 1958. It might be the prelude to much larger investments. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3560/ 9330

EEC TEXTILE FINANCING LOAN--Financing for the Sanoyah textile complex. The Guinean Minister of Planning, N'Faly Sangare, and the European commissioner in charge of Development, Claude Cheysson, signed on 22 December in Brussels a financing agreement relative to modernization of the Sanoyah textile plant. The total cost of the project amounts to 30 million European units of account (1 UC = 5.7 FF). The European Development Fund (EDF) granted a subsidy of 26 million UC to Guinea on this sum and a loan with special conditions attached of 4 million UC. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3560/ 9330

IDA WATER, ELECTRICITY LOAN--The International Development Association (IDA), a branch of the World Bank, has granted Guinea two credits totalling \$13.63 million, as follows: \$12.5 million for a water canalization and purification project, and \$1.13 million for a project of study and development and maintenance of an electric system. The water canalization and purification project will make it possible to build new reservoirs and improve distribution service in Conakry. The percentage of the population served will almost double since it will increase from 18 percent now to 34 percent in 1982. The goal of the second project is to finish preparatory work on a large project to renovate Conakry's electricity distribution system. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3560/ 9330

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IVORY COAST

FALTERING OF ECONOMY REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Dec 78- 3 Jan 79 pp 50-52

[Article by special correspondent Siradiou Diallo: "The Pause; the Ivory Coast Economy Will not be Able to be Indefinitely Protected From the Crisis Shaking up the Western Countries. It is coping undramatically but in a worsened climate"]

[Text] The year 1978 remained traditional. As in the past, the ceremonies marking the anniversary of the independence gave the leaders the opportunity to draw up the balance of the past year and outline the prospects for the future. The round started by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, symbolizing the equality and balance of all provinces, was maintained.

On 7 December, on the occasion of the 18th anniversary, it was Seguela, the city located in the center of the country, that was proclaimed capital of the day. It welcomed all the dignitaries, big and small, of the Ivory Coast, starting with the president and the leading party and state officials.

Noteworthy Concept

This celebration, an exceptional event in itself, was also the time chosen by President Houphouet-Boigny to announce a few major decisions, express the reasons for his satisfaction (or concerns), issue warnings, and earmark the way to be followed.

The officials did not miss the opportunity to praise the virtues of the regime, particularly its economic successes. The press was pleased to publish the results. Over the past three years the growth has averaged 12.5 percent. The Ivory Coast is on the way to becoming the leading world producer of cocoa, beating Ghana. It is already the third biggest producer of cotton, the third biggest exporter of palm oil and, by far, the leading African exporter of pineapples and bananas.

In his traditional message to the nation, President Houphouet-Boigny emphasized that the Ivory Coast has no enemies and that it is intensifying and diversifying its friendships. He then stated: "Thanks to its both firm and flexible policy and awareness of its internal peace and prosperity, it has developed a good image."

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Yet, for once, this chorus of satisfaction formulated by the officials and the media contained false notes. More than usual, both official speeches and writings showed no hesitation to launch a war against "sad spirits," "ill will individuals" and other "impenitent detractors."

Such reactions which are in strange contrast to the traditional easy humor and flegmatic attitude in the face of the criticism of their policy of controlled liberalism, reveal the type of climate currently prevailing in the country. They prove, if not a real concern on the part of official circles, at least a certain embarrassment as to the way the situation has evolved.

Greatly depending on world circumstances, the Ivory Coast economy could not remain indefinitely protected from the crisis which is shaking up the Western countries which are, by far, its main suppliers. As of the second quarter of 1977 the economy has shown a halt.

Surplus Balance

It is certainly exports that are exposed to the risks presented by the international situation. The rates of the coffee and cocoa (together with lumber the main sources of foreign exchange) have been steadily declining since the spring of 1977. Worse, in the 1977-1978 season coffee production declined 30 percent compared with the previous crop. This was a drop which a better cacao crop was unable to balance, at least in terms of marketed tonnage. Timber exports followed the same movement. The poor foreign trade results, therefore, worsened further. However, this will not prevent the balance of trade, once again, to be positive.

The most worrying situation is that of prices. Not only have the prices of imported goods shot up in the course of the past 15 months but the rising curve has been followed by domestic goods as well.

Fighting Inflation

Every quarter the shopping basket of the housewife is becoming lighter and lighter. Attieke and Foutou, foodstuffs based on manioc, yam, and plantain bananas, which are the basic popular staples, are becoming "unaffordable," we were told by a cab driver. Unquestionably, this rise is partially due to the inflation whose gangrene is affecting the economies of the supplying countries. However, it is equally attributable to failures of the Ivory Coast distribution circuits. The latter make it possible for dishonest merchants to profit from the scarcity of goods (unless they organize it themselves) in order to speculate and become richer with less trouble at the expense of the community.

The authorities have indeed restricted credit for the sake of fighting inflation better. Furthermore, important public investments made in recent years, specifically in construction and public works, were substantially reduced in 1978. Nevertheless, the results of such measures will not be felt immediately. Their extent will be determined in the second quarter of 1979.

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There are some who no longer conceal their concern. This applies above all to "expatriates," to Frenchmen living in the Ivory Coast. All of a sudden, such people who had lived over the past 18 years without trouble, in a rather soft environment, are seized by panic. Some expect if not nationalization at least a rather substantial appropriation by the state, infringing upon the ownership of their enterprises. Others are convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the period of prosperity belongs to the past and that inexorably the Ivory Coast will experience economic difficulties if not political upheavals.

On the eve of the 7 December celebrations, the supporters of the system themselves had joined the discontented. Using as a pretext robberies of which they had been the victims, specifically in houses in the vicinity of the Cocody Technical High School, French technical assistants threatened to stop their work "due to lack of adequate security." They addressed themselves to the French ambassador and the Ivory Coast chief of state. It became necessary to increase the number of police patrols, occasionally reinforced by French military personnel from the Port-Bouet Base.

Nevertheless, on 7 December there were few whites in Abidjan who dared to leave their homes. As a result of anonymous leaflets predicting a "blood bath" many of them were expecting that day a real "Saint Barthelemy of cooperation." Naturally, nothing of the sort happened. In order to put an end to this matter, on 12 December the president issued an "appeal to calm and tranquility."

"This is not the first time that the whites have fallen prey to such panic," we were told by an Ivory Coast official who maintains warm working relations with them. "In Europe not a single day goes by without the media reporting aggressions. A single shot fired in Africa would suffice for the whites to be terrorized and threatened to pack their bags," another official claimed, clearly annoyed by the attitude of the French assistants. Let us point out that they are afraid, above all, of what will happen after Houphouet.

Is it in order to cut short such worries that the chief of state recently proclaimed his intention to request the renewal of his mandate in 1981? This would not be excluded. Nevertheless, this initiative, which breaks with a deeply rooted tradition according to which the president would announce his intention to seek a new mandate only at the PDCI Congress (Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, whose leader he is), has not calmed the people down.

In any case, the set-tos and incidents which marked the October 1978 municipal elections contributed to the resurgence of debates on the subject of succession, particularly since the president's decision to organize a new balloting in all districts. This was seen by some as the disowning of Philippe Yace, the party's secretary general, who had supervised these elections.

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In the course of its 18 years of independence, the Ivory Coast has avoided many a trap and surmounted severe crises. It will certainly be able to handle easily the eddies of this year's end.

Raphael-Leygues' Departure

"The attitude of my compatriots is totally groundless." Jacques Raphael-Leygues, French ambassador to the Ivory Coast, makes no effort to conceal his "surprise" and "disappointment."

The wind of panic blowing over the French community in Abidjan corresponds, curiously enough, to the end of an epoch represented by Ambassador Raphael-Leygues. Since his arrival in the Ivory Coast, in February 1963, at a crucial time in the country's political life, this former naval officer rapidly adapted to life in Abidjan.

A long stay in Indochina had trained him well for the games and intrigues inherent in his new career. His familiarity with the parliament under the Fourth French Republic had enabled him to establish useful contacts with the African representatives, one of whom was the future Ivory Coast chief of state.

Jacques Raphael-Leygues added to these valuable advantages an acute feeling for public relations assisted by an exceptionally good memory, to the point that today he is the only diplomat in Abidjan who can address familiarly any minister, high official, or officer.

Simple, courteous, and even-tempered, he is equally at home in offices, social receptions, and the streets, while remaining particularly closely linked with President Houphouet-Boigny toward whom he displays unlimited admiration.

In the salons of Cocody it has even been said that he had become Houphouet-Boigny's best ambassador to France rather than vice versa.

As long as the Gaullists occupied the Elysee and Matignon palaces and the Quai d'Orsay, such a situation could have lasted indefinitely without anyone objecting, Jacques Raphael-Leygues being, himself, part of that group. However, everything changed with the advent of Giscard's regime.

It is being said that President Houphouet-Boigny had to display all his power of diplomacy to extend by several years the Ivory Coast career of Jacques Raphael-Leygues, his friend and neighbor (they are house neighbors in Cocody). At this point, having reached the age limit, the ambassador could no longer stay: "Unfortunately, I cannot amend my birth certificate," he told us jokingly.

Jacques Raphael-Leygues will be leaving Abidjan in January, after a 16-year stay. He will be replaced by Michel Dupuch, a proper Giscardian.

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MADAGASCAR

EXPANDED COOPERATION WITH EAST, WEST

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jan 79 p 41

[Text] French-Malagasy Cooperation

During a visit by the French ambassador, Mr Campredon, accompanied by the new chief of mission, Mr Lechiguero, to the Malagasy Minister of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform, there was discussion of the possibilities of cooperation between the two countries in the field of hydraulics and agricultural mechanization.

On the occasion of an earlier visit the French chief of mission had made a survey of the projects under way and mentioned the prospects for the training of cadres such as veterinary surgeons, agronomists, and those in the waters and forestry services.

Furthermore, the ambassador of France, received by the Malagasy Minister of Transportation, Food, and Tourism, had discussed with the latter cooperation in the field of air, railroad, and ocean transportation as well as the extension of the National School of Naval Instruction at Majunga.

The nationalization of the French Girard and Robic military hospital at Antananarivo on 1 January 1979 was the topic of discussion between the Malagasy minister of defense, Sibon Guy, and the French ambassador, Mr Campredon, on 20 December 1978. The talks also bore on French-Malagasy cooperation in the fields of education, the economy, and defense.

Very Diversified Cooperation

Mr Van der Willigen, new ambassador of the Netherlands to the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, presented on 20 December 1978 the numbered copies of the letter of recall of his predecessor and of his own credentials. Assistance of 145 million Malagasy francs has been granted to Madagascar for the supply of equipment and materials to improve broadcasts and reception of the Malagasy radio network. Radio Nederland, which has a broadcasting station for Africa and the Indian Ocean region in the environs of Antananarivo, will provide technical assistance.

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The Malagasy Minister of Public Works requested the assistance of Switzerland in the field of maintenance of equipment and improvement surveys relating to the various national highways in Madagascar from the Swiss charge d'affaires, Charles Abegglen, whom he received on 12 December 1978.

The Malagasy Minister of Youth and Sports received Mr Nakamura, ambassador of Japan, on 11 December 1978. The minister requested that exchanges of youths be planned as well as assistance in the installation of small production plants to turn out sports equipment.

The Malagasy Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research received the charge d'affaires of China. The discussion bore on the reform of scientific research. The establishment of research institutes in cultivable areas was deemed necessary as was the initiation of a policy of training researchers. The two officials then discussed the exchange of researchers and scientific documents.

Loan Agreement for Telecommunications Signed with Japan

Rakotovao Razakaboana, Malagasy minister of finance and planning, signed on 28 December 1978 in Tokyo with Kaneo Ishihara, president of the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, an agreement under whose terms Japan will make available to Madagascar a loan of 4.5 billion Japanese yen, that is, about 4.8 billion Malagasy francs, for the telecommunications project of southern Madagascar (see MTM of 29 December 1978, p 3516).

The execution of this project was entrusted to the Sumitomo Corporation and the Nippon Electric Company.

The Japanese loan carries interest at 3.5 percent a year and is reimbursable in 25 years which includes a 7-year grace period.

Civil Aviation: New Soviet Aircraft

An Antonov-12 turboprop and a Yak-40 trijet of Soviet manufacture made their appearance in the Malagasy skies at the end of December 1978.

The Antonov-12 aircraft, an intermediate-range transport, was loaned for a year by the USSR to Madagascar to make possible the supply and outshipment of products from its less accessible regions. As for the Yak-40, an intermediate-range transport in its "executive" version, it is a gift of the Soviet Union to be used by President Didier Ratsiraka for more comfort on his trips.

These new aircrafts are in addition to the MiG-17 fighters placed at the disposal of the Malagasy air force by North Korea pending the delivery of the MiG-21 jets ordered by Madagascar from the USSR. For the time being, these planes are flown and maintained by Soviet and North Korean specialists. The training of Malagasy pilots is under way.

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MALI

BRIEFS

FRENCH ENERGY LOAN--The (French) Central Treasury for Economic Cooperation granted Mali, on 19 December, a loan of 25.2 million French francs (2.52 billion Malian francs), which will cover the entire Energy of Mali (EDM) investment program. Involved is the reinforcement of the means of thermal production while waiting for the opening of the Selingue hydro-electric plant and ensuring distribution possibilities at Bamako of the current this plant will produce. At the same time the EDF /French Electric Company/ will help EDM create a modern consumer administration service. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3560/ 9330

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

DUTCH DRAINAGE SYSTEMS LOAN--A vast project for draining rainwater is going to be carried out in Maputo, at a cost of about 200,000 contos (\$6 million). The study of the project began this September and a preliminary report is to be presented to the national Waterboard this month. A team of Dutch technicians is collaborating on the project, which is financed with the help of the Dutch government. Construction work on the principal drainage canal, which will go from a peripheral zone not far from the airport to Maputo Bay, is to be finished by July 1980. The object of the project is to prevent, or at least limit, floods which each year during the rainy season cause great damage to houses and roads in Maputo and its suburbs. It will also make it possible to use rainwater to irrigate vegetable gardens in the suburbs. Construction of new drainage systems is already being carried out in two other cities in Mozambique (Beira and Tete). In Beira, the project calls for extensive use of rainwater to irrigate the rice paddy fields of the region. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3579/ 9330

MOZAMBIQUE-IRAQ AGREEMENT--Mozambique has just signed with Iraq a development agreement providing for new commercial and economic exchanges. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3579/ 9330

MOZAMBIQUE-KUWAIT AGREEMENT--A development agreement has just been signed between Mozambique and Kuwait; it provides aid for an irrigation project in the Limpopo Valley. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3579/ 9330

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM PRODUCTION--Nigeria's petroleum production increased from 1,638,000 barrels/day in January 1978 (2,197,000 in January 1977) to 2,396,000 barrels/day in December (1,852,000 in December 1977). The average for the year is a very respectable 1,907,000 barrels/day compared to 2,098,000 in 1977. The increase begun in April continued steadily to the end of the year, with the exception of a slight drop in October which was quickly recovered. The higher December figure makes it possible to predict, given the favorable international situation, that 1979 production may reach the generally accepted figure of 2.7 million barrels/day. The Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), which controls all the exploiting companies, has in fact authorized them to increase production respectively by the following amounts (barrels/day): Shell-BP--+90,000; Gulf--+65,000; Mobil--+60,000; Agip and ELF--+70,000. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 142]

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

FOURTH POLITICAL POWER--Dakar, 9 Feb, REUTER--Senegal today recognized the country's fourth political power, the rightwing Senegal Republican Movement. The party, led by lawyer Boubacar Gueye, was founded in July 1977. It calls for free enterprise and the abolition of monopolies. Previously, only three political stands were allowed in Senegal: socialism, represented by the party led by President Leopold Sedar Senghor; liberalism, represented by the Senegal Democratic Party; and Marxism-Leninism, put forward by the African Independence Party. The republican movement believes leftwing ideologies cannot provide solutions for the country's economic problems. It advocates a single currency for the Organization of African Unity member countries and closer cooperation with "traditional friends"--France, the United States, the nine-nation European Common Market and the Arab states. [Text] [London REUTER in English 1711 GMT 9 Feb 79 PA]

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